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This thesis develops an automated decision aid capable of generating defensive 
engagement profiles for use in naval shipboard defense. It allows the efficient pairing of 
multiple defensive weapon systems to several incoming threats operating in multiple 
domains by providing the operator with recommended weapon-target pairings based on 
current defensive capabilities and threat profiles.  
The model consists of a pre-processing algorithm and a reward-based mixed-
integer programming model that takes as inputs the available defensive weapon system 
capabilities and incoming target information and outputs a recommended engagement 
profile. Recommended weapon-target pairings are based on the priority of the threat, the 
time available to engage it and the probability of successfully countering it. Additionally, 
the model allows for future planning against threats that may currently be outside the 
defensive envelopes of the ship, but based on current heading and speed may become 
available for pairing, thereby allowing the operator to plan future defensive actions. For 
scenarios involving four defensive weapons and 13 targets, this model produces an 
optimal engagement profile in approximately two seconds on a general-purpose laptop 
and has the potential to be continuously run to provide real-time recommendations to the 
operator. 
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Emerging threats to naval ships include lower-cost, unsophisticated systems that 
can overwhelm ship defensive capabilities when used in large numbers across multiple 
domains (air, surface and subsurface). There is no integrated operational system designed 
to allocate heterogeneous naval defensive weapons to heterogeneous, swarming threats. 
A defensive system capable of countering swarming threats across multiple domains will 
be essential for naval forces that anticipate fighting in contested, high-threat 
environments in the future.  
The Adaptive Rapid Response to Swarming Threats (ARREST) program seeks to 
develop such a capability. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) and Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) have proposed adapting existing Mk 49 Guided Missile Launch 
System to incorporate multiple effectors alongside the rolling airframe missile to address 
surface and subsurface threats in addition to air threats.  
Pairing naval weapons to swarming threats in multiple domains with multiple 
defensive systems is an extremely difficult task that is currently performed manually. For 
the scenarios envisioned, the expected number of possible response options will involve 
numerous possible pairings and millions of unique order-of-engagements. We describe an 
automated decision aid called Athena that assists decision makers by providing high-
quality pairing recommendations in real-time. 
Athena uses a pre-processing algorithm and a mixed-integer linear programming 
model that provides operators with optimal defensive weapon-target pairing profiles that 
best use available assets in contested environments. The pre-processing algorithm takes 
user inputs regarding the available shipboard defense weapons, as well as the 
characteristics of any incoming targets. The algorithm screens the possible weapon-target 
pairings for feasibility based on weapon and target type (air, surface, subsurface) and 
weapon capabilities, such as the weapons engagement envelope and range. Additional 
considerations include the expected time until target impact and the time required to 
engage the threat. Feasible pairings are then assigned a reward value, a function of the 
 xvi 
time available to engage the incoming threat, the priority of the threat and the probability 
of destroying the threat. This reward value is an indicator of the desirability of a given 
weapon-target pairing and is used to identify the most important threats. Additionally, the 
proposed model looks ahead within the scenario and reward values for feasible weapon-
target pairings are calculated for the present location of the incoming threat, as well as 
where the threat will be at user-defined time intervals. Viewing the engagement in three 
distinct time periods provides the model with the ability to pair weapons and targets in 
the future that may not be feasible at present due to range and envelope restrictions. 
These reward values are then used within a mixed-integer linear programming model that 
works to optimally pair available weapons to targets with the objective of maximizing the 
total reward of the engagement profile. The results of this assignment problem are then 
reported to the user for further prosecution.  
In a test scenario of four incoming targets to be countered with two multi-domain 
capable RAM launchers, the average model solve time using Microsoft Excel VBA for 
pre-processing and GAMS/CPLEX for the mixed-integer linear program is 
approximately two seconds on a general purpose laptop computer. This grows to 
approximately three seconds for an expanded scenario of 13 targets and four defensive 
weapons systems evaluating 312 unique weapon-target pairings across the three time 
periods.  
As envisioned, this model could be operated with or without an operator-in-the-
loop, depending on the systems available, expected threats, and commander’s intent. In 
addition, this model has the potential to be implemented within a networked ship-defense 
environment, allowing multiple ships to share defensive systems. This networked ship 
defense would provide mutual support for ships defending against incoming swarm 
threats by optimally tasking available defensive systems in a coordinated manner. While 
we focus on the integration of the RAM system, the model can accommodate virtually 
any shipboard weapon system, including the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), 
M2 .50-caliber machine gun, Mk 45 5” deck gun and the Vertical Launch System (VLS) 
utilizing various Standard Missiles (SM), Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) and 
Evolved SeaSparrow Missiles (ESSM).  
 xvii 
Implementation of this model can provide the operator the ability to quickly and 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xix 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my beautiful wife, Brittany, for her patience and support 
throughout my time at the Naval Postgraduate School. Her constant encouragement was 
crucial in my endeavors over the past two years and I am certain that my success is 
directly attributable to her unwavering and consistently upbeat spirit. I would not be 
where I am today without her and I look forward to our future adventures.  
To my advisor and second reader, LCDR Connor McLemore and Dr. Matthew 
Carlyle, there is no way to measure the amount of guidance you provided in this work. 
Your creative thinking and unsurpassed ability to refine even the roughest of ideas was 
instrumental to achieving our goals and none of this would have been possible without 
your assistance.  
To the NPS faculty and staff, your expansive knowledge and dedication are truly 
world class. Every faculty member I had the privilege to work with during my time at 
NPS was more than willing to provide students with the most valuable of resources; their 
time. For this, I am truly grateful and I hope to repay you, and the Navy, in my future 
assignments.  
 xx 




A. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW 
Multi-domain swarming threats are at the forefront of naval defense debates; U.S. 
defensive systems are vulnerable to swarming attacks that can simply overwhelm 
defensive capacity. Drone technology and increasingly dangerous long-range anti-ship 
missiles have become widely proliferated and relatively cheap. Defending naval forces 
against combinations of such threats is complicated. In a 2014 Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) media release regarding the development of unmanned surface vessels capable of 
autonomously conducting swarming operations, then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Jonathan Greenert, noted that “networking unmanned platforms … is a cost-effective way 
to integrate many small, cheap and autonomous capabilities that can significantly 
improve our warfighting advantage” (p. 1). While these technologies and tactics represent 
new warfighting opportunities, they also present a threat to existing naval forces. As 
swarming technology matures, the threat it poses to ships will continue to increase, and 
achieving adequate defensive responses from existing manual processes will become 
increasingly unlikely.  
ONR, with Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) support, is exploring 
methods to counter swarming threats through the Adaptive Rapid Response to Swarming 
Threats (ARREST) program. Specifically, “the ability to organically engage a number of 
threats” is an identified and well-documented critical need across the naval forces 
(ARREST Technology Assessment Briefing, 2014, p. 2). The focus of the ARREST 
program is to develop a system capable of efficiently countering multiple threats across 
multiple domains. Ideally, the use of an in-service platform would reduce cost and allow 
for quicker fielding of the system.  
Prominent shipboard defense systems currently in use in the U.S. Navy include 
the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), packaged within the Mk 49 Guided Missile 
Launching System (GMLS), the Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) and the Evolved 
SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM). ONR and NAVAIR are researching the development of the 
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GMLS as a multi-domain defensive system, packaging multiple effectors with the ability 
to counter air, surface and subsurface threats within a single platform. The GMLS is 
currently used in the U.S. Navy aboard carriers (CVN), large-deck amphibious ships 
(LHA, LHD) and smaller amphibious transport and dock ships (LPD, LSD). As seen in 
Figure 1, the envisioned system would allow a single defensive unit to counter multiple 
threats spread across multiple domains.  
Figure 1.  Envisioned Multi-Domain Engagement with ARREST 
 
ARREST Multi-Domain Ship Defense System. Countering multiple threats across 
multiple domains presents a complex battlespace management scenario. The proposed 
integration of multiple effectors within the GLMS allows a single asset to counter 
multiple threats across multiple domains. Source: Office of Naval Research (2014). 
Adaptive rapid response to swarming threats concept briefing. Presented at Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
The Navy still requires an automated decision aid that is capable of rapidly pairing 
defensive weapons to multiple targets operating in multiple domains so that the proposed 
system can be efficiently tasked. An automated system is essential as battlespace 
complexity and types of available weapon systems continue to grow. We propose fast pre-
processing algorithms operating in conjunction with a mixed-integer programming (MIP) 
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model for weapon-to-target assignment. With this method, weapon-target pairs can be 
made rapidly, allowing the operator to quickly identify the most important incoming threats 
and assign a defensive asset to engage. This system could be used to inform decision 
makers of the best available engagement profile in a highly contested environment or, in 
some threat environments, be allowed to automatically pair defensive systems to incoming 
threats for engagement without operator intervention. 
We propose a solution that relies on a two-step method of pre-processing and 
optimization. The pre-processing step includes the input of data pertaining to the 
battlespace, as well as the necessary calculations required for the subsequent engagement 
optimization. The optimization utilizes an MIP to quickly assess the feasible response 
options and provides optimal weapon-target assignments given current target information 
and ship capabilities. This automation reduces the workload of the operator, allowing all 
possible response options to be considered in a much shorter time than possible with a 
manual process.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Work within command and control (C2) stations aboard ships operating in hostile 
and contested areas can be overwhelming. Operators must be able to quickly orient 
themselves within the battlespace, assess the situation and respond to threats. With 
multiple incoming threats and multiple defensive options available to counter, the number 
of possible response options can grow rapidly and may prove too numerous to efficiently 
consider. In contested environments, the abilities of the operators to assess the battlespace 
and respond accordingly can rapidly degrade. 
Currently, operators must identify the weapon-target pairings to execute over an 
extremely short period. These pairings must be made quickly with only the information 
presented by the ships’ warning systems. In such situations, it is possible to overlook an 
important aspect of the engagement, such as the range and envelope capabilities of the 
weapon employed or the order in which the threats are engaged.  
Ideally, the identification and prioritization of the most dangerous threats should 
lead to a working pairing profile; however, this process is not always straightforward. 
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While “dangerous” in the typical sense refers to identifying the threat most capable of 
damaging the ship, this may not always be the case. We must also consider the time 
aspects of the engagement in order to produce a hierarchical target-priority list and 
engage those threats that pose immediate danger to the ship first, not necessarily those 
with the highest capacity to damage.  
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II of this thesis discusses the inherent difficulties of optimally and 
efficiently pairing weapons and targets in highly contested environments from the 
standpoint of the operator. Chapter III describes the proposed model in more detail, 
outlining the pre-processing algorithm and the mixed-integer programming model used to 
solve for the optimal engagement profile. Chapter IV illustrates the use of this model in 
notional test scenarios. Chapter V presents conclusions and potential future work in the 
advancement of this model.  
D. BACKGROUND OF WEAPON PAIRING OPTIMIZATION 
Much of the previous work referenced in this research was conducted to aid 
planners in air tasking and mission assignment. While the process of air tasking is quite 
different from naval ship defense, many of the critical factors involved, as well as the 
modeling and methodology, are applicable to shipboard defense. Of particular note is the 
prioritization of threats and the use of fast pre-processing algorithms and mixed-integer 
programming optimization.  
Air-tasking operations were researched by Dolan (1993) and Crawford (1994) and 
resulted in automated and optimized pairing recommendations. Their work included 
target prioritization and pairing recommendations that quickly assessed a static 
environment and enabled tasking optimization in advance of execution. Castro (2002) 
went on to develop an optimization tool that allowed for the handling of time-sensitive 
targets within the air-tasking environment. Research done by Weaver (2004) continued 
the development of previous models and determined that a decrease in the model runtime 
was necessary for future operations. Follow-on research by Zacherl (2006) focused on 
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speeding up this processing time and developed the Rapid Asset Pairing Tool-Operations 
Research (RAPT-OR) model.  
More recent work by McLemore (2010) and Albrecht (2015) extended and 
increased the fidelity of the RAPT-OR model for use by C2 operators, providing mission 
pairing profiles in real time. Both McLemore (2010) and Albrecht (2015) employ reward-
based mixed-integer programming models used to identify the most effective and 
efficient use of air assets based on weapon, target and timing criteria. This method of 
producing optimal weapon-target pairing is at the heart of this thesis, as a reward-based 
MIP organically produces a hierarchical output of weapon-target pairings, thereby 
identifying the most critical threats posed to a ship in a defensive situation.  
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis is intended to formalize the mathematical implementation of an 
automated weapon-target pairing model for use in shipboard defense scenarios. The focus 
of this research is to illustrate the approach to solving such scenarios, as well as 
demonstrating the model’s capabilities. The model developed within this work highlights 
the pre-processing algorithms required to assess the battlespace, as well as the 
formulation of a mixed-integer programming model to provide weapon-target 
recommendations to the operator for a situation.  
While this thesis proposes an automated system designed to provide decision 
makers with a planning tool, without extensive systems integration, it is limited by the 
information available for use. All inputs required for the model to be fully implemented 
are required to be manually entered by the user given the lack of tie-in with a functioning 
radar and fire-control system. This includes all weapon and target characteristics, as well 
as the ship heading and speed. As such, it is a stand-alone demonstration model of a 
future naval capability and would require extensive integration with shipboard systems to 
produce a working defensive system. 
In addition, all of the system data used within the thesis was obtained from open 
sources and is unclassified. Thus, it is only an approximation of the actual capabilities of 
the systems described. However, the underlying mathematical formulation is relevant; 
any data within the model can be easily adapted.  
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II. WEAPON-TO-THREAT PAIRING IN CONTESTED 
ENVIRONMENTS 
A. CURRENT OPERATIONS 
There is no existing automated C2 process that provides coordinated 
heterogeneous weapon pairing recommendations for swarming threats. Currently, combat 
information center (CIC) operators tasked with defending the ship receive target 
information from the ship’s radar and fire control systems, including weapon-target 
pairing recommendations for engagement of incoming threats. Such systems generally 
rely on a time-based interpretation of what threats pose the most immediate risk to the 
ship, identifying those with the least amount of time until impact as the highest priority. 
When the system is used in a man-in-the-loop mode, operators are provided with a 
recommended weapon-target pairing indicating which defensive weapon system should 
be used to counter the incoming threat, which the operator can then approve for 
prosecution. Operators also have the option of placing the system in an automatic 
engagement mode, thereby allowing the system to track and engage incoming threats 
without operator intervention. 
The shortfalls of the current system lie in the isolated nature of the weapons 
involved. Current defensive systems are limited in what weapon-target pairings are 
considered, as the separate weapon systems do not communicate with each other. 
Defensive systems are paired to targets within a vacuum with little consideration for the 
overall optimal defensive engagement profile, instead focusing on the first available 
response for the most time-critical threat.  
Additionally, current systems do not accurately account for multi-domain 
capabilities within a single defensive unit. The addition of these multi-domain 
capabilities within the RAM launcher, and any extension of the optimization to other 
defensive systems aboard the ship, presents the system and operator with many choices 
for countering an incoming threat. In these situations, manually selecting a feasible 
response, as opposed to calculating the most effective response, is unlikely to produce a 
high-quality defense solution for the ship. We propose an optimization model that 
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accounts for all possible weapon-target pairings, even those that are currently infeasible 
but may become an option in the near future, that incorporates multiple systems with 
multi-domain capabilities. This model provides operators with an optimized engagement 
profile across all domains and available weapon systems. 
B. CHALLENGES IN PROPOSED FUTURE OPERATIONS 
A scenario where a ship encounters multiple threats simultaneously, each 
potentially requiring a different counter-munition, could result in even experienced 
operators becoming overwhelmed. In these situations, it would be easy to simply throw 
all available resources at the threat; however, this is most likely not efficient and may not 
even counter all threats within the battlespace. In time-sensitive defensive scenarios, the 
decision-maker must quickly identify the most dangerous threat and formulate an 
effective response, a task that can become unmanageable given the number of available 
alternatives.  
Additionally, shipboard defense is an extremely time-sensitive operation. For 
example, an anti-ship missile with a maximum speed of Mach 2 (~700 m/s) launched 
from 5 nautical miles (~10,000 m) leaves the operator with approximately 15 seconds to 
decide on and execute an appropriate response. Couple this with the possibility of 
multiple threats being launched simultaneously and the time available to assess and 
decide quickly decreases.  
This section outlines the key operational issues of executing defensive 
engagements in these highly contested environments, as well as some of the advantages 
of automating the process to the operator decision-making.  
1. Multi-Domain Swarming Threats 
For the scenarios envisioned, it is assumed that a ship could come under fire from 
multiple sources simultaneously. These threats would be engaged in a numbers game, 
seeking to saturate the battlespace with many targets in the hope that the ship’s defensive 
systems become so overwhelmed that they cannot defeat all incoming threats. As 
previously noted, ONR is already conducting its own research into offensive swarming 
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through the use of autonomous fast-attack boats. ONR research employed 13 autonomous 
fast-attack boats during a live demonstration (Office of Naval Research [ONR] Media 
Release, 2014, p. 1).  
Saturating the battlespace with enough targets to overwhelm a ship’s defensive 
capabilities will become an increasingly common tactic, as it is likely that the operators 
in existing systems can be overwhelmed. The time from detection to engagement, the 
pairings chosen by the operator, as well as the order in which the threats are engaged, can 
determine the success or failure of the engagement. As noted before, the time constraints 
associated with an engagement can be limiting, even for a modest number of threats. The 
ability of the operator to assess and decide is a critical element for the success of the 
engagement. 
Additionally, there is no guarantee that swarming threats will be operated within a 
single domain (i.e. air, surface or subsurface). Hostile naval attacks of the future will 
likely employ forces across multiple domains, requiring a coordinated effort of defensive 
measures. Naval shipboard defensive systems will be required to prosecute multiple 
threats, including air, surface and subsurface threats simultaneously. This over-saturated 
battlespace must be quickly and accurately evaluated before any defensive action can be 
taken.  
Lastly, many threats carry their own offensive capabilities. Attack aircraft and 
fast-attack surface craft carry secondary weapons. These secondary weapons must be 
taken into account in any defensive engagement, as allowing one of these incoming 
targets to close within firing range of the ship means the threats has effectively 
multiplied, with one threat becoming multiple threats. With this in mind, it is important to 
consider these secondary capabilities within the battlespace in order to formulate a 
defensive engagement profile that prevents these incoming targets from closing within 
firing range of the ship. 
2. Multiple Defensive Systems 
In addition to the number of threats to the ship, a multitude of response options 
must also be accounted for, and may complicate the decision-making process. For 
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example, a simple scenario of just 3 incoming threats engaged by two distinct weapon 
systems leaves the operator with 6 unique pairing options to consider. This is not an 
extraordinary number of choices in itself, however, when ordering is considered, this 
number becomes 120 pairing options. In this scenario the operator must quickly identify 
and exclude any infeasible pairings before considering any viable response plan. In an 
expanded scenario of 13 incoming targets and 4 weapon systems available, similar to the 
demonstration conducted by ONR in 2014, the number of unique pairing options grows 
to 52, while the set of unique weapon-target pairings to address all threats grows to more 
than 600 billion, even when order-of-engagement is ignored.  
The number of response options are too numerous for an operator to consider in a 
short time in high-stress situations. Additionally, there are other considerations; the 
available ammunition within each defensive system, the engagement envelope and range 
of the defensive system and the type of munitions available within each. Pairing weapons 
and targets without including all of these considerations will almost certainly result in 
sub-optimal pairings. 
In addition to considering the feasibility of each potential pairing based on range 
and weapon envelope, the operator must also account for the available munitions within 
each weapon system. ONR has envisioned modifying the existing RAM launchers to 
incorporate surface and subsurface capable munitions. The introduction of additional 
munitions within a single unit further complicates the decision process. The current RAM 
system includes 21 individual launch tubes. The proposed surface munition would 
include 3 munitions within a single launch tube. If equally loaded with air, surface and 
subsurface munitions, a single unit would contain 35 munitions, leaving the operator to 
track 70 munitions across both available RAM systems.  
While experience can certainly offer some insight into the proper response, it is 
sometimes difficult to create even a feasible engagement profile in high-stress 
environments and an automated system would be valuable.  
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C. ADVANTAGES OF AN AUTOMATED DECISION AID 
We propose utilizing an automated decision-making process to account for the 
important factors in a defensive naval engagement, identify the feasible pairings and 
choose the optimal defense profile.  
In practice, such a system would be capable of accounting for important factors 
within an engagement, including availability of defensive weapons and incoming target 
information. This system could be used to provide a recommendation to the operator on 
the optimal defensive engagement profile given the current situation. When needed, this 
system could also operate in a fully automatic mode that allows the system to assign 
weapon assets to incoming targets and immediately send the targeting information 
weapon system for prosecution.  
1. Tactical Decision Aid for Operators 
While the potential for automatic engagement of incoming threats is a valuable 
tool in high-threat environments, it may not always be the preferred method of operation. 
Factors such as battlespace complexity, mission, expected threats and commander’s 
intent will all play a role in deciding the mode of engagement and may not allow for the 
use of a fully automatic defense system.  
The previously mentioned factors will play an important role in the method of 
operation of any ship defense system. These factors will dictate whether the system 
should be used as a planning tool or a fully automated defense system. Keeping the 
operator in the decision making process will be extremely useful in almost all cases due 
to the large number of non-hostile vessels transiting many of today’s operating areas. 
Keeping the operator as the final approval authority in the kill-chain decreases the 
likelihood of mistaking a friendly or neutral vessel as hostile. Additionally, while 
warships must always be ready to respond to a threat, today’s operations are not 
conducted with the expectation of being overtly attacked by a large force as they would 
in a time of war.  
In these cases, having an operator in the loop to make critical decisions regarding 
the defense of the ship may be preferred. With an operator in the loop, the battlespace 
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would be assessed by the ship’s combat systems and processed accordingly. Once the 
best available engagement profile has been identified, the operator would be provided 
with the optimal weapon-target pairings for further adjudication and tasking. While this 
method may not be as fast and efficient as the fully automatic mode, it does have the 
advantage of keeping the operator in the decision-making process, and is especially 
useful in situations of restricted combat when contacts within the battlespace are 
considered to be non-threats. In such an environment it is important to allow the operator 
to make the final determination on whether a target is a threat and should be prosecuted. 
In this case any recommendations provided by the Athena model could be pre-loaded into 
the ship’s fire control system, ready to be tasked pending operator approval in a manner 
that is similar to current procedures. This recommendation can be provided to the 
operator within 1–2 seconds for most scenarios allowing the operator to quickly 
prosecute the engagement.  
2. Fully Automatic Pairing and Engagement  
In cases where the battlespace warrants an automatic engagement mode, this 
model could be used as a quick and efficient means of identifying the optimal 
engagement profile and immediately pass weapon-target pairings on to the ship’s fire 
control systems. Situations that may dictate the use of an automatic engagement mode are 
those in which a high number of hostile threats are overwhelming the defending force. 
Most, if not all, actors in the area of operations (AO) would be considered hostile and the 
threat of collateral damage to surface and air traffic would be minimal. AO’s in which all 
contacts are considered hostile, such as in unrestricted warfare scenarios, would create 
extremely dense threat environments in which the time to assess, decide and engage 
threats would be greatly reduced. Environments meeting these criteria could employ an 
automatic pairing and engagement system to shorten the kill-chain and thereby increase 
the survivability of the ship.  
This fully automatic mode of operation would allow the ship’s defensive systems 
to automatically detect, track and engage incoming threats without operator intervention 
and would be most useful in extreme circumstances, such as when the ship defenses are 
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overwhelmed by the number of incoming threats. In these situations, the response time 
and decision making of the operator can become a weak-link. Removing the burden of 
requiring an operator to contemplate numerous defensive options would allow the system 
to automatically choose the best available defensive options for the unfolding scenario in 
real-time and respond accordingly. This method of operation would greatly reduce the 
engagement timeline, from detection to execution, potentially allowing the system to 
respond to more threats than would otherwise be possible with human intervention. This 
operating mode also has the advantage of potentially freeing up operators to focus on 
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III. NAVAL WEAPON ASSIGNMENT MODEL FOR DYNAMIC 
HIGH-THREAT ENVIRONMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the Athena weapon-assignment system, including the inputs 
and outputs, pre-processing and mixed-integer programming (MIP) model required to 
formulate and recommend a defensive response to a given threat scenario. The system is 
comprised of two parts: a pre-processing algorithm to properly prepare the necessary data 
and MIP formulation to generate optimal weapon-target pairings. 
B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
Some assumptions must be made in order to implement a demonstration model 
within the framework of this thesis. The largest assumption made in this regard is that the 
information used in the model inputs are, or would be, available to be passed to the model 
by shipboard systems. This includes a classification of the threat (air, surface, 
subsurface), a calculation of the target’s probability of hitting the ship, its threat 
classification (i.e., low, medium, high or non-threat) and any secondary weapon 
capabilities. These parameters are critical to the prioritization of targets within the model 
and must be included in order to identify an optimal engagement profile. While these are 
extremely important characteristics for the model to consider, in the event that shipboard 
systems cannot provide them in real-time, they could be hard-coded into the system with 
minimal impact. For example, different target types could be modeled with type-based 
parameters such that all targets within a certain type-class would automatically be 
assigned parameters associated with that type (i.e., all surface craft would be assigned a 
medium threat level with secondary weapon capability). This would alleviate some of the 
burden of identifying the incoming targets individualized parameters while still giving 
the model an accurate picture of the unfolding scenario.  
Another assumption made in the demonstration of this model is that all weapon-
target pairings result in the elimination of the incoming threat and no follow-on pairings 
are required. While this assumption is not necessarily valid, it is also not critical, as real-
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world implementation of this system would result in continuous target updates. In this 
case, as long as the target appears within the battlespace it will be considered for pairing 
within each model execution. This continuous pairing consideration would allow for 
follow-on shots to be executed in the event that the initial engagement was not 
successful.  
C. ASSET-TO-THREAT ASSIGNMENT MODEL 
We formulate the weapon-target assignment problem as an integer linear program 
with the following sets, parameters, variables and constraints. 
1. Sets 
w W∈       Weapon system, identified by its name 
l L∈   Launchers available for use on weapon 
system 
s S∈       Subsystems available for use in launchers 
t T∈       Target identification 
p P∈       Time Period 
( , , , , )w l s t p A W L S T P∈ ⊆ × × × ×  Assignment tuple representing a weapon w 
utilizing launcher l with subsystem s against 
target t in time period p, corresponding to a 
feasible pairing. 
2. Parameters 
, , , ,w l s t preward  Reward value for pairing weapon w, 
launcher l and subsystem s to target t in time 
period p 
 
, ,_ w l sweap avail  Ammunition available for weapon w, 
launcher l and subsystem s 
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3. Decision Variables 
, , , ,w l s t pASSIGN   Binary Variable; 1 if weapon system w is 
utilizing launcher l and subsystem s is 




, , , ,
, , , , , , , ,
( , , . , )
MAX
w l s t p
w l s t p w l s t pASSIGN w l s t p A
reward ASSIGN
∈
∑ ×   (3.1) 
, , , , 1w l s t p
p
ASSIGN ≤∑ ,    ( , , , ) Aw l s t∀ ∈  (3.2) 
, , , ,
( , , , ) A
1w l s t p
w l s p
ASSIGN
∈
≤∑     t∀     (3.3) 
, , , , , ,
,
_w l s t p w l s
t p
ASSIGN weap avail≤∑    ( , , )w l s A∀ ∈    (3.4) 
, , , , 0,1w l s t pASSIGN ∈      ( ) Aw,l,s,t, p∀ ∈   (3.5) 
  
5. Formulation Discussion 
Equation (3.1), the objective function, employs the model to maximize the total 
reward by choice of the binary variable , , , ,w l s t pASSIGN . Equations (3.2) through (3.5) 
represent the constraints placed on the model in the assignment process. Equation (3.2) 
allows the model to make each unique weapon-target pairing only once across all time 
periods and prevents the model from repeatedly making the same pairing in multiple time 
periods. Equation (3.3) constrains the model to pairing each target only once, preventing 
the model from pairing multiple assets to the same target which, if allowed, could lead to 
other threats not being addressed. Equation (3.4) only allows pairings to be made if there 
is ammunition available within the assigned weapon system and equation (3.5) constrains 
the decision variable, , , , ,w l s t pASSIGN , to be binary. The binary nature of the 
, , , ,w l s t pASSIGN  variable serves to clearly identify which pairings are made and allows the 
model to calculate the overall reward for the engagement.  
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D. PRE-PROCESSING 
The feature of our model that guides the pairing decisions is the set of 
, , , ,w l s t preward  coefficients. Calculating these rewards requires pre-processing of all of the 
scenario data. The pre-processing algorithm used in this model takes static inputs from 
the Microsoft Excel user interface to conduct all pre-processing functions, including data 
input, feasibility checks and reward value calculations for the considered weapon-target 
pairings. The following subsections describe the major functions of the pre-processing 
algorithm.  
1. Inputs 
Inputs are required for all incoming targets, the current status of the ship and 
available weapon systems. These inputs are used to calculate the critical parameters for 
the prioritization of targets and feasibility of weapon-target pairings. Required inputs and 
their units are highlighted below: 
a. Ship Characteristics 
_ wship heading    Heading of weapon system w [degrees true] 
_ wship speed     Speed of weapon system w [knots] 
b. Weapon System Characteristics 
,l,s_ wmission type   Mission type of weapon system w and launcher l 
utilizing asset s [Air, Surface, Subsurface] 
, ,_ w l sweap avail   Number of weapons in weapon system w, launcher l 
and subsystem s [number] 
, ,_ w l sweap range   Maximum engagement range of weapon system w 
utilizing launcher l and subsystem s [meters] 
, ,_ w l sweap speed   Speed of subsystem s fired from weapon system w 
and launcher l [meters/second] 
w,l,s_weap env   Engagement envelope of weapon system w utilizing 
launcher l and subsystem s [degrees relative] 
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,l_ wweap swing   Maximum swing rate of weapon system w using 
launcher l [degrees/second] 
_ sweap pkill  Probability of kill for weapon subsystem s 
[probability] 
c. Target Characteristics 
_ ttarget type   Mission type required by target t [Air, Surface, 
Subsurface] 
_ ttarget speed   Speed of target t [meters/second] 
_ ttarget range    Range of target t [meters] 
_ ttarget bearing    Bearing of target t [degrees relative] 
_ ttarget heading   Heading of target t [degrees true] 
_ ttarget threat   Damage potential of target t if it hits the ship 
[integer from 0 to 3] 
_ ttarget phit     Probability that target t hits the ship [probability] 
d. Secondary Weapon Systems  
_ tsec range   Firing range of secondary weapon systems on target 
t [meters] 
_ tsec threat   Damage potential of secondary weapon systems on 
target t [integer] 
_ tsec phit   Probability that secondary weapon systems 
launched from target t hit the ship [probability] 
2. Time Periods 
This model allows engagements to be viewed in multiple discrete time periods to 
facilitate the planning process. Viewing the engagement in discrete, user-defined 
intervals allows the model to “plan ahead” for targets that may be outside of the weapon 
engagement envelope based on bearing or range at the outset of the model run. This also 
allows the system to naturally provide secondary and tertiary target options for operator 
consideration.  
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With this feature, the model not only considers the current state of the battlespace, 
but also looks ahead to determine where the ship and targets will be at the outset of the 
next time interval based on current course and speed. These intervals are user-adjustable, 
providing flexibility to the operator to adjust the look-ahead time based on expected 
engagement timelines. Approaching the scenario in this manner allows the model to 
consider engaging targets immediately or wait for a later time period, as well as allowing 
for the pairing of targets that are currently infeasible but may become feasible at a later 
time. This future pairing availability gives the operator a more accurate picture of the 
unfolding engagement and allows them the option to immediately task a weapon to a 
target or wait to engage in favor of another, more urgent threat. It also increases the 
operator’s situational awareness and provides a clearer picture of the unfolding scenario. 
Targets within the model may also be “passed off” between available weapon 
systems based on their position at the start of each time period (i.e., entering and leaving 
weapon envelopes). This opens up the model to consider additional weapon-target 
pairings across all time periods and effectively choose the pairing and time-period 
combination that is most advantageous.  
3. Feasibility 
Once the model inputs have been captured, the model conducts an initial 
feasibility check. For each weapon-target pairing considered, weapon and target types 
(i.e., air, surface, subsurface) are compared and, if matched, the algorithm proceeds with 
the necessary calculations.  
Additional feasibility checks for the weapon envelopes are conducted throughout 
the pre-processing algorithm. For each time period considered a check is conducted to 
determine whether the target currently resides within the weapon envelope. Targets 
falling outside of weapon envelopes are considered infeasible and are immediately 
assigned a reward value of zero. These weapon engagement zone (WEZ) feasibility 
checks are conducted for each weapon-target pairing and time period considered within 
the engagement. 
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4. Timing Calculations 
Concurrent to the feasibility checks, multiple timing-based calculations are 
executed. These calculations identify the time available and time required to engage the 
incoming threat and serve to identify to the most imminent threats to the ship. 
First, a time-until-impact is calculated for the considered target using its closing 
speed. This calculation is used to represent the time available to engage the threat before 
it hits the ship. In the case of targets with secondary weapon systems capable of firing on 
the ship, the time until the target is within firing range is also calculated and the shorter of 
the two times is used in the reward calculation. The firing range for secondary 
capabilities can be target-specific or, in some cases, be user-defined, allowing the 
operator to set the minimum distance that threats should be allowed to approach.  
Additionally, the time to fire at and intercept the threat is calculated using the 
available weapon characteristics. The time-to-fire calculation is concerned with how long 
it will take the weapon system to get into position to fire at the incoming target and is 
based on the current heading of the weapon system, the bearing to the target and how 
quickly the weapon system can be traversed to the appropriate heading. Additionally, the 
time for the effector to intercept the incoming target is calculated using the closing speed 
between the target and the effector, were it fired immediately.  
The difference in these two calculations is then used to calculate the time 
available to engage the threat and is subsequently used as a critical parameter the reward 
value for each pairing, where those pairings with less time available earn more reward.  
Pseudo-code for all pre-processing feasibility controls and calculations is outlined 
in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.  Pre-Processing Pseudocode  
 
Pre-processing pseudocode for the Athena model. This pseudocode outlines the 
feasibility controls and important calculations required for solving the model. If a pairing 
is feasible within any given time period, its reward value is calculated for use in the 
mixed-integer programming model to determine the optimal weapon-target assignment 
profile. If a pairing is infeasible within a given time period, it is discarded and the pairing 
feasibility in the next period is assessed. This is done for all weapon-target pairs that are 
of the same type (i.e., air-air, surface-surface, subsurface-subsurface). 
5. Calculated Data  
In addition to the well-defined calculations required, such as the closing speed of 
the target and the time until impact, additional parameters are constructed to aid in the 
execution of the model. Parameters indicating the priority of the target, and the 
probability of successfully destroying it, are required to properly calculate the reward 
value for the pairing. These parameters are calculated as follows: 
 
 310 _ _t t tpriority target threat target phit= × ×   (3.1) 
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The calculated parameters are subsequently used in the MIP reward function and 
serve to aid in the prioritization of incoming threats. Equation (3.1) sets the priority of the 
incoming threat according to its threat level and probability of hitting of the ship. 
Equation (3.2) the same as equation (3.1), but is instead a function of the secondary 
weapon capabilities of the incoming threat. These equations weight the threat of the 
target heavily, thereby encouraging the model to assign weapons to the most dangerous 
threats first. Equation (3.3) is used to vary the probability of successfully killing an 
incoming threat, instead of utilizing a single probability of kill for a given weapon 
system. The probability of kill is a function of the maximum range of the weapon system 
and the range of the target during a given time period, resulting in a value between .78 
and 1.  
6. Reward Value 
The reward function utilized in this model is adapted from previous work in air 
mission tasking conducted by McLemore (2010) and Albrecht (2015). Their work 
developed and refined pairing reward values dependent upon target priority, probability 
of kill, number of weapons and targets and the time available and required to conduct the 
air mission. A similar methodology is used here, with minor deviations.  
The reward value calculated for pairings within this model are a function of the 
target’s priority, the probability of kill of the defensive launcher and subsystem against 
that target and the amount of time required and available to engage the target. In cases 
where the target’s secondary weapon systems are the main threat to the ship the reward 
function is largely unchanged, the only difference being the priority value used within the 
calculation. The reward value function is outlined in equation (3.4). 
 
 , , , ,0.025*,l,s, , ,l,s,t,p
1( ) ( _ ) (100 )w l s t pfreetimew t p t wreward priority prob kill e p
−= × × × ×   (3.4) 
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The first term is the priority of the incoming target and is used to lend weight to 
those targets that are deemed to have the highest potential for damage to the ship. For 
example, torpedoes or high-speed anti-ship missiles have the ability to significantly 
degrade a ship if a successful hit occurs, while small arms aboard a patrol craft have little 
chance of degrading the ship if not engaged; this value allows the model to prioritize the 
highest threats and results in a value between 0 and 270. The second term allows for the 
prioritization of targets based on the expected probability of successfully engaging and 
destroying the threat. This value, between .78 and 1, is a function of the weapon systems 
maximum range and is calculated for each feasible pairing within a given time period. 
The third term is a function of the freetime variable, which is the difference between the 
time available and time required to engage an incoming threat. This term allows the 
prioritization of those targets that pose the most immediate threat to the ship and carries a 
value between 0 and 100. The final term of the reward function serves as a penalty for 
pairing targets in later time periods. Dividing by the time period in which the pairing is 
considered (i.e., period 1, no penalty; period 2, divide total reward by 2 etc.) encourages 
the model to make weapon-target pairings earlier in the scenario instead of waiting until 
the last second to gain as much as reward as possible during the MIP operation. The sum 
of these four terms is then used as the total reward value for pairing a weapon to a target 
within a particular period. 
Reward values calculated for all feasible weapon-target pairings identify the most 
urgent threats to the ship and serve to naturally prioritize them, alleviating the 
computational burden of enumerating all possible orders of engagement. The total reward 
value is a number between 0 and 27,000, with higher reward values representing more 
desirable pairings. The reward value has little meaning in itself, however, its value 
relative to other pairing options is important. Only weapon-target pairings with a reward 
value greater than a user-specified cutoff value are included in the subsequent MIP 
formulation. This prevents the model from assigning pairings with extremely low reward 
values due to low probability of successfully neutralizing a threat, low threat priority or 
extremely long time-to-impact, and is useful as an ammunition-saving measure.  
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IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
A limited test scenario was constructed in order to demonstrate how the model 
pairs available weapon systems and targets. In addition, expanded and stressed test 
scenarios were conducted in order to verify the model’s ability to handle larger and more 
complicated threat profiles, as well as determine the time required to solve the scenarios. 
All scenarios were carried out on an Asus general-purpose laptop operating Windows 10 
Home Edition with an Intel Core i3-5010 @ 2.10GHz. 
A. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
The Athena front-end uses Microsoft Excel for user-interface and pre-processing. 
Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) code is used to pre-process all input data 
and calculations required for the model, formulate the MIP and report the optimal 
pairings to the user. We use the free SolverStudio extension to connect our Excel user 
interface to the optimization model and solver. 
The Athena optimization model was implemented utilizing the General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) modeling language with the CPLEX solver. GAMS software 
consists of a language compiler and integrated solvers for mathematical programming 
and optimization and both requires a license for full functionality. When used with the 
SolverStudio extension, all input data is calculated and loaded within the Excel 
environment, at which point an output file is compiled and passed over to the GAMS 
software for solving and, once complete, the results are passed back to the Excel 
environment. This allows the user to complete the entire process within a single user 
environment, without switching between software or constructing software-specific input 
and output files.  
While the GAMS/CPLEX combination requires expensive licenses, there are 
other modeling languages and solvers available for use within the environment that are 
free. In order to alleviate the licensing requirements during the research phase of this 
thesis and allow a wider distribution, the model was also implemented in the Pyomo 
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modeling language with the COIN-OR Branch & Cut (CBC) solver. Pyomo is an 
optimization extension that uses the Python modeling language. 
B. TEST SCENARIO 
The following test scenario was developed to validate the models automated 
calculations and pairing assignments. In this scenario a large-deck amphibious assault 
ship is steaming north at 15 knots and is faced with multiple threats in multiple domains 
simultaneously. This scenario depicts a ship encountering four threats spread across the 
air, surface and subsurface domains as shown in Figure 3.  
The defensive systems available for use on the ship include two RAM launchers 
loaded with surface-to-air, surface-to-surface and surface-to-subsurface munitions. To 
model this multi-domain capability within the optimization, each RAM system is 
subdivided into its component munitions and is modeled as a unique, standalone system. 
For example, in this scenario each RAM launcher is input three times, each with a 
different Type variable to indicate its intended mission, representative of what munition is 
being modeled. This allows the system to treat each munition as an individual entity, as 
well as allows for the input of munition-specific weapon characteristics.  
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Figure 3.  Visual Depiction of Test Scenario 
 
Test Scenario Visualization. In this scenario, a large-deck amphibious assault ship is 
confronted with incoming targets spread across air, surface and subsurface domains. The 
red circle around the surface target is representative of secondary weapon system firing 
range, while the blue regions indicate the operating envelope of the ship’s defensive 
systems. Ranges are not to scale. 
All weapon characteristics are contained within a dedicated tab in the Excel GUI 
and includes ammunition available, range, speed and envelope inputs as shown in Table 
1. Target characteristics, including range, speed, heading, threat and probability of hit, as 
well as information regarding secondary weapon capabilities are included within the 
model in the form of static data inputs as shown in Table 2. These tables are screen 
captures from the Excel GUI used to provide inputs to the Athena model.  
Table 1.   Test Scenario Weapon Inputs  
 
Test Scenario Weapon Inputs. Static weapon system characteristics tab within the 
model. This table contains the characteristics of the available defensive weapon systems 
within this test scenario, including the weapon identification, type, available ammunition 
and capabilities.  
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Table 2.   Test Scenario Target Inputs  
 
Test Scenario Target Inputs. Static target characteristics tab within the model. This 
table contains the characteristics of each identified target, including its type, range, 
bearing and threat index. Targets carrying secondary weapons, such as Surf1, also require 
inputs regarding the capabilities of the secondary weapon system.  
Once the ship, weapon and target characteristics are loaded into the Excel user 
interface the scenario can be run. The first task to be executed is the pre-processing 
calculations required to assign a reward value to each pairing. During pre-processing, 
weapon-target pairings are screened for feasibility and the set of possible pairings is 
reduced from 72 to 11 feasible pairings across all time periods based on weapon-target 
compatibility, weapon range and weapon envelope.  
These feasible pairings and associated reward values are then populated into the 
mixed-integer programming model, as seen in Table 3. This formulation is used to assign 
weapon-target pairings by varying the binary decision variable ASSIGN. The assignment 
of this variable is determined by identifying the combination of pairings that maximizes 
the total reward of the optimization while satisfying all constraints. The recommended 
pairings for the outlined test scenario is shown in Table 4.  
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Table 3.   Test Scenario MIP 
 
Test Scenario MIP Formulation. Feasible weapon-target pairings are shown with their 
respective reward values. Each row represents a combination of weapon, munition, target 
and time period to be considered within the MIP model. The Assigned column is used as 
the decision variable within the MIP, and is assigned a binary value to indicate whether 
the assignment is made (1 if assigned, 0 otherwise).  
Table 4.   Test Scenario Assignment Report 
 
Test Scenario Assignment Report. Recommended weapon-target pairings for notional 
test scenario. The pairings are ordered by reward value within each time period (highest 
reward listed at the top of each period) and are indicative of the recommended 
engagement order.  
In this scenario, the automated pairing tool provides intuitive pairing decisions 
rapidly. The Air1 target is identified as the highest priority, as it has the shortest time 
until impact and poses a high threat to the ship. As this target is feasible in time period 1 
it is paired immediately to the RAM1 weapon system. Similarly, the Sub1 target was 
identified as having the longest time until impact, and thus, the greatest available time to 
engage. Therefore, this target could be assigned to a later time period in order to address 
more time-sensitive threats. The surface target, Surf1, is not itself a threat to the ship; 
instead, the secondary weapons it is carrying are the primary threat. So, although Surf1 is 
relatively far away from the ship, moving at a slow speed, it only has to get within its 
secondary weapon system firing range to become an extreme threat to the ship. As such, 
the model pairs it to an available defensive system when prior to it reaching firing range 
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of the ship. A visual depiction of the engagement profile showing the pairings made by 
time period is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  Test Scenario Engagement Profile 
 
Visualization of Test Scenario Engagement Profile. Weapon-Target pairings are 
depicted by color-coded lines. Red lines indicate an immediate pairing, while blue and 
green lines represent pairings recommended for time periods 2 and 3, respectively. 
Ranges are not to scale.  
While Athena presents a recognizable solution to an operator, it is important to 
note that this automation looked at all possible pairings and identified the optimal profile 
in a very short time. When this scenario was run ten times on a general-purpose laptop, 
utilizing GAMS with CPLEX, the average time to solve the scenario was approximately 
two seconds. This time includes all pre-processing calculations (0.17 seconds), 
optimization (1.89 seconds) and report generation (0.06 seconds).  
31 
C. EXPANDED SCENARIO 
In order to demonstrate the usefulness and ability of such a system when there are 
a large number of possible pairings, an expanded test scenario was developed. This 
scenario equips the same ship with two CIWS self-defense systems along with the RAM 
launchers used in the previous test scenario. Additionally, the target space has been 
expanded from 4 targets to 13. A visual depiction of the battlespace is provided in Figure 
5. While the previous scenario resulted in 72 possible pairings across the time periods, 
this scenario results in over 300 possible pairings and depicts how complex the decision-
making process can become.  
Figure 5.  Visual Depiction of Expanded Test Scenario 
 
Visualization of Expanded Test Scenario. Battlespace depiction of a large-deck 
amphibious assault ship presented with multiple incoming threats spread across multiple 
domains. Threats in this scenario include 5 air targets (4 missiles, 1 aircraft), 5 surface 
targets with secondary weapon capabilities and 3 subsurface targets. In this scenario all 
targets are presented as approaching the ship’s locations, however, this is not a 
requirement of the model. Ranges are not to scale.  
As in the previous test example, the RAM platforms are loaded with surface-to-
air, surface-to-surface and surface-to-subsurface munitions. The CIWS platforms used in 
this scenario are depicted as having the capability (i.e., ammunition available) to engage 
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two threats each, either air or surface. Tables 5 and 6 outline the weapon and target 
characteristics of this test scenario. 
Table 5.   Expanded Test Scenario Weapon Inputs  
 
Expanded Test Scenario Weapon Inputs. Static weapon system characteristics tab 
within the model. This table contains the characteristics of the available defensive 
weapon systems within this test scenario, including the weapon identification, type, 
available ammunition and capabilities. This scenario includes two RAM launchers with 
air, surface and subsurface capabilities and two CIWS with air and surface capabilities. 
Table 6.   Expanded Test Scenario Target Inputs  
 
Expanded Test Scenario Target Inputs. Static target characteristics tab within the 
model. This table contains the characteristics of each identified target, including its type, 
range, bearing and threat index. This test scenario includes 5 air targets, 5 surface targets 
and 3 subsurface targets.  
As previously noted, this expanded scenario greatly grows the possible pairing 
space. The 312 possible pairing options are reduced during the pre-processing feasibility 
controls to just 53 feasible pairings before being loaded into the optimization model. The 
model produced during this test scenario is comprised of 46 constraints and 54 variables, 
53 of which are binary and when run on the same general-purpose laptop requires an 
average solve time of three seconds, a small increase to accommodate the additional 140 
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possible pairings. Table 7 and Figure 6 outline the assignment results and engagement 
profile of this expanded scenario, respectively. 
Table 7.   Expanded Test Scenario Assignment Report 
 
Expanded Test Scenario Assignments. Recommended weapon-target pairings for 
expanded test scenario. The pairings are ordered by reward value within each time period 
(highest reward listed at the top of each period) and are indicative of the recommended 
engagement order. 
Figure 6.  Expanded Test Scenario Engagement Profile 
 
Visualization of Expanded Test Scenario Engagement Profile. Weapon-Target 
pairings are depicted by color-coded and differentiated line segments. Solid line segments 
represent RAM pairings while dashed lines represent CIWS pairings. Additionally, red 
lines indicate an immediate pairing while blue and green lines represent pairings 
recommended for time periods 2 and 3, respectively. Ranges are not to scale.  
D. STRESSING SCENARIO 
To better understand the capabilities and limitations of the model a test scenario 
was developed to stress it and determine whether significant solve-time increases occur. 
This stressed model consisted of 150 incoming targets, broken into equal groups of 50 
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across the three domains. Target parameters for each type of threat were randomly 
generated within a type-defined state space. In addition, the available weapon systems 
were expanded to include 4 RAM launchers and 4 CIWS.  
The Athena model generates a MIP with over 300 decision variables and is 
executed using the GAMS/CPLEX model on the same desktop computer. The timing 
results for all test scenarios conducted, in both GAMS/CPLEX and Pyomo/CBC are 
provided in Tables 8 and 9, respectively.  
Table 8.   GAM/CPLEX Runtime Results  




Processing MIP Reporting Total 
Simple 2 4 11 0.17 1.89 0.03 2.09 
Expanded 4 13 53 0.72 2.26 0.06 3.04 
Stressed 8 150 357 13.28 1.99 0.50 15.77 
Timing Results for Example Scenarios. Average time, in seconds, to execute the model 
in GAMS/CPLEX. Additionally, the pre-processing, MIP and assignment reporting times 
are individually presented. Reported times are averages of 10 runs. Solve times for the 
MIP do not increase appreciably, however, pre-processing calculations do increase 
sharply as the number of possible pairings increases.  
Table 9.   Pyomo/CBC Runtime Results 




Processing MIP Reporting Total 
Simple 2 4 11 0.16 2.95 0.03 3.15 
Expanded 4 13 53 0.75 3.57 0.06 4.38 
Stressed 8 150 357 13.16 4.84 0.49 18.49 
Timing Results for Example Scenarios. Average time, in seconds, to execute the model 
in Pyomo/CBC. The GAMS/CPLEX combination is approximately 30% faster than the 
Pyomo/CBC combination in the simple and expanded scenarios.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
This decision aid is intended to provide naval operators with a tool to quickly and 
accurately assess a complicated battlespace and respond to swarming threats. The 
existing manual process hinders the speed and efficiency of real-time weapon-target 
pairing in high-threat environments. This tool could be used in an automatic pairing-
engagement mode to optimally engage a large number of threats, were systems 
integration to occur. The use of this model against swarming threats cuts down on 
operator workload and reduces the kill-chain timeline associated with shipboard defense. 
Additionally, more weapon-target pairings can be considered with this model than in 
current manual processes, allowing for a more tailored and optimal defensive 
engagement. 
B. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
While this model has shown the ability to provide timely and intuitive solutions to 
complicated problems, there is still much to be done. First and foremost, Athena does 
require the user to input all data manually through the Microsoft Excel user-interface, a 
method for data input that clearly renders the system less useful for shipboard defense. 
Before the model can be used in a defensive engagement, integration with shipboard 
radar and targeting systems, such as the systems in use aboard the CVN, LHA, LHD and 
LPD class ships, is essential.  
Additionally, in cases such as shipboard defense against multiple threats, solve-
time is of the utmost importance. In this regard, any system used for this purpose should 
be of sufficient speed to deal with multiple threats in real-time. This model was 
predominately constructed and tested on a general purpose laptop and solved the limited 
test scenarios in approximately 2 seconds. Implementation on faster, dedicated hardware 
and software would allow for continuous, real-time assignment.  
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The most exciting possibility is networking Athena with an entire naval defensive 
group. Were this done, friendly ships could coordinate their defensive efforts against 
swarming threats. If this model was included on all ships in an operating environment 
with shared target and weapon data, a coordinated optimization could be conducted in 
order to produce the optimal defense of all ships in the battlespace. The sharing of 
information would allow ships that are in danger of being overwhelmed by incoming 
threats to receive support from other ships operating area. This network would create a 
robust system of self-defense, producing real-time engagement profiles within the 
battlespace and serving to coordinate the defensive actions of the group.  
With regard to the model itself, certain fine-tuning will allow for better weapon-
target pairings. System parameters, including the probability of kill, swing rate and 
munition speed are notional; actual system data should be used for realistic results. 
Additionally, sensitivity analysis of the weighted parameters within the reward function, 
such as the free time and priority expressions, would allow the model to better prioritize 
incoming targets for assignment. Subject matter expert input and modeling and 
simulation analysis could better identify the critical weighting of these parameters to 
ensure the best pairings are made in regard to operating environment and mission. 
Additionally, if this model is to be implemented in a real-time, continuously updated 
environment a persistence constraint should be added to the optimization formulation. 
The introduction of a persistence constraint would discourage the model from 
continuously changing pairing recommendations based on updated information, which 
may have the effect of complicating the engagement profile. With the inclusion of this 
constraint, the model would be penalized for changing the pairing profile from one run to 
the next, and as such, would only do it if it is absolutely necessary. This would serve to 
ensure the operator gets consistent and coherent pairing recommendations throughout the 
engagement.  
Lastly, this thesis was conducted at the unclassified level in order to ensure full 
distribution. All figures and data used in the development of this thesis were estimated 
from open-source information.  
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